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) 
[L. A. No. 24145. In Bank. Mar. 22, 1957.] 
Estate of WILLINORE M. FOSSELMAN, Deceased. HAR-
RIET PALMER, Appellant, v. CHARLE~ F. SAL-
KELD, as Executor, etc. et a1.. Respondents. 
[1] Wills-Testamentary Capacity-Evidence.-Testamentary in-
competency on a given day may be proved by evidence of in-
competency at times prior to and after the day in question. 
[2] Id.-Testamentary Capacity-Presumptions and Inferences.-
When it is shown that testamentary incompetency exists and 
that it is caused by a mental disorder of a general and con" 
tinuous nature, the inference is reasonable, and there may 
even be a legal presumption (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963,· subd. 32), 
that the incompetency continues to exist, and such an inference 
is particularly strong where decedent was suffering from senile 
dementia. 
[3] Id.-Testamentary Capacity-Evidence.-A determination that 
testatrix was of unsound mind when she executed holographic 
documents offered for probate as codicils to her will was sus-
tained by testimony of a bank official, an attorney, a doctor' 
and a psychiatrist from which the trial court could reasonably 
conclude that during a three-year period prior to her death 
the testatrix was suffering from senile dementia in an ad-
vanced stage and that she could not comprehend the extent 
and character of her property or her relation to those who 
would be the natural objects of her bounty, while said docu-
ments were executed during the last two years. 
(4a.,4b] Id.-Testamentary Capacity-Evidence.-A determination 
that testatrix was suffering from an insane delusion as to a 
legatee's identity, and that such delusion was the effective 
cause of the execution of purported codicils, was sustained by 
evidence that she persistently claimed that the legatee was an 
old friend who had worked for testatrix' mother despite re-
peated explanations to the contrary. 
[1) See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 10; Am.Jur., Wills, § 104. 
!ticK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, § 45(1); [2] Wills, 163; (I! i 
Wills, § 71; [4] Wills, 176; L6J Wills, § 69. 
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[5] ld.-Testamentary Capacity-Burden of Proof.-Contestants 
have the burden to prove not only that testatrix was suffering 
from a claimed insane delusion as to a legatee's identity, but 
also that such delusion bore directly on and influenced thr 
execution of the purported codicils. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County denying petition for probate of holographic 
documents claimed to be be codicils to a will. C. M. Monroe, 
Judge. Affirmed. 
George R. McClenahan for Appellant. 
Luce, Forward, Kunzel & Scripps and Edgar A.. Lnce for 
Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Harriet Palmer filed a petition for probate 
of two holographic documents claimed to be codicils to the 
last will and testament of Willinore M. Fosselman. One reads: 
"I give and bequeath to my friend, Harriet Palmer, the 
sum of ten thousand 10,000 June 17th 1953 to be paid to her 
after my death (death). 
The other reads: 
Willinore M. Fosselman 
4656 - 49th St. 
San Diego, Cal." 
"J an. 12th, 1955 
•• When I die, I want this house to be given to Mrs. Harriet 
Palmer for her to live in if she chooses. 
Willinore Fosselman 
4656 - 49th St." 
Charles F. Salkeld, as executor, and Adele Marsh Rowe, 
residuary legatee under the will, contested the admission of 
these documents to probate on the ground that :Mrs. Fossel· 
man lacked the mental capacity to make a valid codicil at 
the times she executed them. 
After a trial without a jury the court found: 
" ... that at the time said two purported codicils ... were 
written, dated and signed, and continuously up to the death 
of said decedent, s,h~'was suffering from senile dementia and 
was of such mental incompetency as to render her incapable 
of executing a Will, and was suffering from an insane delusion 
to the effect that Harriet Palmer was an old family retainer 
) 
) 
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who had been in her family many years previously, and was 
a very old friend; and that in fact the said decedent actually 
had known the said Ha'rriet Palmer as an employee of only 
a few months standing when the said delusion became fixed, 
which said delusion was the effective cause of the execution 
of said instruments and which instruments would not have 
been executed by the said testator were it not for the said 
insane delusion." (Finding VII.) 
u. . • that at the time of the execution of each of said 
instruments and continuously up to the time of her death 
the said decedent was mentally incompetent to execute a Will 
or codicil and had not sufficient mental capacity to be able to 
understand the nature of the acts she was doing nor to under-
stand and recollect the nature and situation of her property 
or her relation. to the persons who had claims upon her 
bounty .... " (Finding VIII.) 
Accordingly, the court entered judgment denying the admis-
sion of the two documents to probate. Petitioner appeals 
on the ground that the findings of the trial court are not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
Prior to April, 1950, Mrs. Fosselman resided in New York 
City. She maintained with the Bankers Trust Company a 
securities-custodian account, which at the time of her death 
was of the approximate value of $460,000. The account was 
under the supervision of Charles F. Salkeld, a vice-president 
of the company, upon whom she came to rely for personal 
and business advice. In New York, Mrs. Fosselman was 
considered to be intelligent and quite alert for her age. 
In April, 1950, Mrs. Fosselman moved to San Diego, Cali-
fornia, intending to make her home there. Shortly after 
her arrival in San Diego, she tripped and fell in a hotel lobby 
and suffered a broken hip. She was treated by Dr. R. L. 
Hippen and removed to Mercy Hospital, where she remained 
for about seven weeks. While in the hospital she executed a 
win disposing of her entire ~tate and appointing Mr. Salkeld 
executor. At about the same time she asked Mr. Salkeld and 
Ralph Bullock, her New York attorney, to take charge of 
her financial affairs, and to that end she gave Mr. Bullock a 
general power of attorney. Edgar A. Luce was appointed her 
local attorney and charged with the management of her affairs 
in San Diego. '.thereafter all bills were presented to Mr. 
Luce, who transmitted them to New York for payment. A 
small checking account, the balance not to exceed $500, was 
established in Mrs. Fosselman's name in a San Diego bank. 
) 
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Mrs. Fosselman drew checks on that account for miscellaneous 
items until shortly before her death. On several occasions 
Mr. Bullock thought it advisable to obtain Mrs. Fosselman's 
consent to the transfer of funds or securities, and for that 
purpose Mr. Luce obtained Mrs. Fosselman's signature. 
Upon her release from the hospital, Mrs. Fosselman was 
moved to a house, purchased with her funds, at 4656 49th 
Street in San Diego. She was attended throughout the day 
and night by three nurses working in shifts of eight hours 
each. A chauffeur was employed to take her on afternoon 
drives. Dr. Hippen remained her physician and visited her 
occasionally. Mr. Luce visited her on the average of once a 
week. 
Petitioner was one of the nurses employed to care for 
Mrs. Fosselman. She had served originally as a relief nurse, 
.but upon the death of one of the regular nurses in 1952, 
she was employed to attend Mrs. Fosselman regularly during 
the hours from 7 a. m. to 3 p. m., and she served in that 
capacity until Mrs. Fosselman's death. It is undisputed that 
:Mrs. Fosselman appeared to be fond of petitioner. It is also 
undisputed that Mrs. Fosselman appeared to be equally fond 
of the other nurses. 
Mrs. Fosselman died on March 25, 1955, at the age of 88 
years. She was the last survivor of a family of 10 children 
and left as surviving relatives only nieces and nephews. 
The purported codicil dated June 17, 1953, was first dis-
covered after Mrs. Fosselman's death. Petitioner testified that 
she had been requested to clean out Mrs. Fosselman's desk 
and that in doing so she found a sealed envelope wrapped in 
tissue. The purported codicil was in the envelope. Petitioner 
testified that she had no knowledge of it before that time. 
The purported codicil dated January 12,1955, was delivered 
to petitioner by Mrs. Fosselman during her lifetime. Peti-
tioner testified that on January 12, 1955, Mrs. Fosselman 
stated that there was something she wanted to do before she 
forgot it and that l\Irs. Fosselman handed her a piece of 
paper, stating, "Here, honey, you read this." Petitioner 
read it and replied, "Well, you don't have to do anything 
for me," and Mrs. Fosselman said, "Well, I know it. Do 
you think it is all right T" Petitioner replied, "Yes, it is." 
Mrs. Fosselman then stated, "Now, if you don't think this is 
all right, you take it to a lawyer and have it checked." Mrs. 
Fosselman then tod the paper to the living room and later 
returned and handed petitioner a sealed envelope, stating, 
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"Now, you are not to open this until after I die or pass 
away. " She opened the envelope after Mrs. Fosselman's 
death and found that it contained the paper that Mrs. Fossel-
man had shown her. 
Petitioner testified that on January 12, 1955, Mrs. Fossel-
man seemed to be aware of what she was doing, that her 
conversations were logical and reasonable, and that there was 
nothing in her conduct that would suggest that she was 
insane. "She was just like she had always heen." With 
respect to Mrs. Fosselman's mental condition on June 17, 
1953, petitioner gave her opinion that Mrs. Fosselman was 
not insane, that in the middle of 1953, Mrs. Fosselman seemed 
to be aware of what was going on in the world, who her 
relatives were, and that she had some property. Petitioner 
admitted that Mrs. Fosselman thought that she had known 
petitioner in Kansas City as an employee of Mrs. Fosselman's 
mother and that they were old friends; that when petitioner 
would correct her and explain that such was not the case, Mrs. 
Fosselman would say, "Now, that's right," but would subse-
quently reassert that she had known petitioner in Kansas 
City; that Mrs. Fosselman sometimes thought she was in New 
York; that she sometimes did not know that she owned the 
49th Street house, but thought that she rented it from a 
landlord who was demanding an increase in rent; that she 
often felt that she did not have sufficient money to pay the 
household help; that she repeated herself constantly; and 
that Mrs. Fosselman insisted that the nurse who died in 1952 
had stolen some chairs that in fact had been given away by 
Mrs. Fosselman in New York. Petitioner did not think that . 
this behavior was illogical or irrational. She testified that 
she would not consider a person insane unless he was totally 
unconscious of his environment. 
Several women who were neighbors of Mrs. Fosselman and 
who had visited her occasionally during the last five years 
of her life testified that she was able to converse with them 
about simple domestic matters and that she was not insane. 
Mr. Salkeld visited Mrs. Fosselman five times during the 
last five years of her life. He testified that her mental condi-
tion started deteriorating in October, 1950, and that from that 
time until her death she became progressively confused. He 
testified that she remembered old events but nothing recent; 
that at times she,thought she was in New York; that she 
constantly thought she did not have enough money and that 
when he tried to explain her property to her, she could Dot 
') 
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"absorb it"; that she thought she had once owned a house 
in New York and wondered what had become of it, although 
she had never owned a house there; that she referred to her 
deceased brothers as being alive; and that on his last visit 
in March, 1954, he went to see her on the afternoon of one 
day and the morning of the next day, but Mrs. Fosselman 
was unable to recognize him. It was his opinion that from 
the fall of 1952 until the time of her death Mrs. Fosselman 
was unable to comprehend the nature and extent of her prop-
erty or her relation to those who would be the natural objects 
of h~r bounty. 
Mr. Luce recounted in detail his weekly visits with Mrs. 
Fosselman. He testified that except for one occasion, on 
January 31, 1951, Mrs. Fosselman was unable to converse 
intelligently with him about her property or business affairs; 
that she could not tell him about her accident in the hotel; 
that she could not understand the settlement that was made 
with the hotel's insurer; that despite his repeated explana-
tions, she could not understand the source of the money that 
was being used to pay the nurses and household expenses; 
that she referred to some deceased members of her family 
as being alive and thought that others were dead, who in fact 
were alive; that she persistently claimed that petitioner had 
worked for her mother in Kansas City and was an old friend 
despite repeated explanations that petitioner was not even 
born at the time referred to. Mr. Luce gave his opinion 
that from 1952 until the time of her death Mrs. Fosselman 
was unable to comprehend the nature and extent of her 
property or her relation to those who would have a natural 
claim upon her bounty. 
Dr. Hippen testified that Mrs. Fosselman was unable to 
comprehend what was going on around her; that she was 
never "completely associated about time"; that she frequently 
thought she was in New York City; that she did not "associ-
ate" the persons around her "as being nurses" and "never 
did quite comprehend who they were or what they were and 
she frequently got them mixed up with people she had known 
in the past"; that she thought she was destitute and fre-
quently expressed the fear that she would be unable to pay 
his bill; that from 1952 on she was suffering from senile de-
mentia, a generalized softening of the brain owing to impaired 
blood supply, and t.hat in his opinion, Mrs. Fosselman, from 
1952 until the tilJ)e of her death, was unable to comprehend 
the nature and extent of her property or her relation to those 
. who would be the natural objects of her bounty. 
) 
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Lola R. Stephens, one of the nurses attending Mrs. Fossel-
man, testified that Mrs. Fosselman had stated many times 
that petitioner worked for Mrs. Fosselman's mother, although 
Mrs. Stephens repeatedly corrected her; that Mrs. F(JSSelman 
could not understand any reading; that she was confused 8.11 
to where she was; and that she thought that her brothers 
would pay her bills, although her brothers were dead. 
Mortimer Lumpkin, Mrs. Fosselman's chauffeur, testified 
that Mrs. Fosselman thought that she had known petitioner in 
Kansas City and that she often thought she was in New York. 
Dr. Carl Lengyel, a psychiatrist to whose qualification coun-
sel stipulated, in answer to a long hypothetical question based 
upon the evidence, stated his opinion that from 1952 until 
t4e time of her death Mrs. Fosselman was suffering from 
brain disease, probably arteriosclerosis, and was of unsound 
mind, and that during that period she could not comprehend 
the nature or extent of her property or her relation to those 
who would be the natural objects of her bounty. 
The Finding of General Testamentary Incompetency 
Is Supported by the Evidence. 
Relying on the well established rule that successfully to 
contest a will on the ground of lack of capacity a contestant 
must prove testamentary incompetency at the time of execu-
tion of the will (Estate of Lingenfelter, 38 Cril.2d 571, 580 
[241 P.2d 990] ; Estate of Perkins, 195 Cal. 699, 703 [235 P. 
45]), petitioner contends that the finding that Mrs. Fosselman 
lacked testamentary capacity at the times she executed the 
purported codicils is not supported by the evidence. Peti-
tioner points out that none of the witnesses for contestants 
testified as to Mrs. Fosselman's mental condition on June 17, 
1953 and January 12,1955, the days on which she executed 
the purported codicils. She urges that the only evidence of 
Mrs. Fosselman's mental condition on June 17, 1953 is the 
purported codicil itself and that it discloses no incompetency, 
and that the only evidence of Mrs. Fosselman's mental condi-
tion on January 12, 1955 is the testimony of petitioner and 
the purported codicil itself and that this evidence tends to 
show that Mrs. Fosselman had testamentary capacity. 
[1] Testamentary incompetency on a given day, however, 
may be proved by evidence of incompetency at times prior to 
and after the day in question. (Estate of Perkins, supra, 195 
Cal. at 703; Estate ~f Lingenfelter, su.pra, 38 Ca1.2d at 580; 
see Vitale v. Vitale; 147 Ca1.App.2d 665, 669-670 [305 P.2d 
) 
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690].) [2] Once it is shown that testamentary incompe-
tency exists and that it is caused by a mental disorder of a 
general and continuous nature, the inference is reasonable 
(see Estate of Baker, 176 Cal. 430, 437-438 [168 P. 881]; 
Vitale v. Vitale, supra). perhaps there is even a legal pre-
sumption (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 32; see Estate of 
Schwartz, 67 Cal.App.2d 512, 521, 522 [155 P.2d 76] ; Byrne 
v. Fulkerson, 254 Mo. 97, 123 [162 S.W. 171]; Bever v. 
Spangler, 93 Iowa 576, 601 [61 N.W. 1072]) that the in-
competency continues to exist. Such an inference is particu-
larly strong in a case such as this in which the decedent was 
suffering from senile dementia, a mental disorder that becomes 
progressively worse. (Byrne v. Fulkerson, supra, 254 Mo. at 
121-122, 123; Bever v. Spangler, supra, 93 Iowa at 597.) 
"Senile dementia begins gradually, is progressive in character 
and in its advanced stages 'the brain is well-nigh stripped of 
its functions.' The difficulty lies in determining the point at 
which in its progress it has so impaired the faculties that they 
fall below the mark of legal capacity .... " (Byrne v. Fulker-
son, supra, 254 Mo. at 121; see Page on Wills, Lifetime ed., 
vol. 1, p. 284, § 138.) [3] In the testimony of Mr. Salkeld, 
Mr. Luce, Dr. Hippen, and Dr. Lengyel there is an abundance 
of evidence from which the trial court could reasonably con-
clude that from 1952 until the time of her death Mrs. Fossel-
man was suffering from senile dementia in an advanced stage 
and that she could not comprehend the extent and character 
of her property or her relation to those who would be the 
natural objects of her bounty. Petitioner's testimony, the 
purported codicils themselves, and the fact that Mrs. Fossel-
man drew checks on a small account established in her name 
and that on several occasions Mr. Bullock thought it advisable 
to obtain her consent to the transfer of funds or securities 
constitute evidence that conflicts with the evidence presented 
by contestants. The trial court resolved that conflict and 
found that the decedent was incompetent. We cannot say as 
a matter of law that the finding was unreasonable. 
The Finding that the Decedent Was Suffering from an Insane 
Delusion as to Pet'itioner's Identity is S11pported 
by the Evidence. 
[48.] The evidence supporting the finding of an insane de-
lusion is even stronger than the evidence supporting the 
Anding of general'incompett'llce. There is abundant evidence 
that Mrs. Fosselman persistently claimed that petitioner was 
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an old friend who had worked for Mrs. Fosselman's mother in 
Kansas City despite repeated explanations to the contrary. 
Petitioner herself testified that Mrs. Fosselman entertained 
that belief. The only evidence that Mrs. Fosselman was ever 
able to rid herself of this delusion is petitioner's testimony 
that when petitioner would explain to Mrs. Fosselman that 
she was mistaken, Mrs. Fosselman would say, "Now, that's 
right. " Petitioner admits, however, that shortly thereafter 
Mrs. Fosselman would reassert her unfounded belief. 
The Finding that the Insane Delusion Was the Effective 
Cause of the Execution of the Purported Codicils Is 
Supported by the Evidence. 
[5J The burden was upon contestants to prove not only 
that Mrs. Fosselman was suffering from the insane delusion 
but that that delusion "bore directly upon and influenced 
the creation and terms" of the purported codicils. (Estate of 
Perkins, supra, 195 Cal. at 704.) [4bJ Petitioner points to 
the uncontradicted testimony that Mrs. Fosselman was fond 
of petitioner and contends that it could be inferred there-
from that the purported codicils were the result of that 
affection and not the insane delusion. The court found, 
however, that the purported codicils were the result of the 
insane delusion, and that conclusion too is reasonably inferable 
from the evidence. Although it is undisputed that Mrs. 
Fosselman was fond of petitioner, it is also undisputed that 
she was equally fond of the other nurses. It may have been 
significant to the trial court that no bequests were made to 
any of the other nurses. We cannot say as a matter of law 
that the trial court could not find the facts as it did. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred in the jUdgment. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance, but 
I cannot refrain from commenting upon the gracious declara-
tion in the majority opinion, after narrating the overwhelming 
evidence in support of the finding of the trial court on the 
issue of testamentary incompetency of the testatrix, that: "We 
cannot say as a matter of law that the finding was unreason-
able." How any finding of fact based upon sufficient compe· 
tent evidence could be anything but "reasonable" is beyond 
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a finding of testamentary incompetency or undue influence in 
a will contest is such an unusual event that it can only be 
characterized by unusual language. The majority opinion 
also states: uOnce it is shown that testamentary incompe-
tency exists and that it is caused by a mental disorder of a 
general and continuous nature, the inference is reasonable 
[citations] ... that the incompetency continues to exist." It 
is not my understanding that the reasonableness of an infer-
ence or a conclusion reached by a trier of fact on sufficient 
competent evidence is for this court to determine. On the 
other hand, when the claim is made that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the finding of the trier of fact, the 
function of this court is limited to a determination of whether 
there is any substantial evidence, including inferences or pre-
sumptions which may arise from proven facts, to support 
the conclusion reached, and when a trier of fact has resolved 
an issue of fact, its determination is binding upon an appellate 
court unless the evidence against such determination is such 
that reasonable minds could come to no other but a contrary 
conclusion than that reached by the trier of fact. In this 
process the reasonableness of the inferences to be drawn from 
the proven facts is for the trier of fact and not for an 
appellate court. The above quoted language from the major-
ity opinion gives rise to a new concept of appellate court 
review of factual determinations by trial courts, which concept 
I assume will be invoked only in will contest cases when this 
court sees fit to affirm a determination by a trial court that 
a will is invalid because of the testamentary incompetency of 
the testator or was procured by the undue influence of the 
proponent of the will. As I have heretofore pointed out in 
my dissenting opinions (Estate of Lingenfelter, 38 Ca1.2d 571 
at page 588 [241 P.2d 990] ; Estate of Welch, 43 Ca1.2d 173 
at page 181 [272 P.2d 512] ; Estate of Bullock, 140 Cal.App. 
2d 944, 950 [295 P.2d 954, 297 P.2d 633] ; Estate of Keeney, 
140 Cal.App.2d 688, 694 [295 P.2d 479, 297 P.2d 636]), that 
with one single exception (Estate of TeeZ, 25 Ca1.2d 520 [154 
P.2d 384]) the majority of this court has taken the position 
that the determination of the factual issues in a will contest 
is the function of this court and not of the trial court or jury, 
thus repealing, by judicial fiat, section 19 of article VI of 
the Constitution of California and section 371 of the Probate 
Code. While the de~ision in the case at bar may seem to be a 
departure from the policy heretofore followed. I am convinced 
that the same legal philosophy which I have denounced 
) 
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in my dissents in the above cited cases still prevails and 
will be invoked in future cases involving will contests so long 
as this court remains as it is now constituted. 
In my opinion the evidence of testamentary incompetency 
is no stronger in this case than it was in any of the cases 
which I have hereinbefore cited, which the majority of this 
court held, as a matter of law, was insufficient to invalidate the 
will involved in those cases, and while a correct conclusion 
is reached by the majority in the case at bar, the reasoning 
of the majority in arriving at such conclusion is out of har-
mony with the settled rule with respect to the function and 
power of an appellate court to review the d~termination of 
an issue of fact by a trial court. 
